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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
That.the witness in this case is not privileged, as the mere act
of receiving and conveying the title to real estate about which
there has not been any action pending, does not bring him within
the former common-law rule, as to privileged communications to
attorneys and counsel, and since the enactment of 1847 no such
privilege exists which can be claimed for the witness in this case.
That the questions are pertinent to the issue and proper, and
the witness must answer.
.BLATCHFORD, J.-On the facts stated by the Register, the five
questions set forth were proper, and must be answered by the
witness, and are not within the privilege of confidential commu-
nications between attorney and client.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
COURT OF APPEALS Or MARYLAND.'
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.F
AsSUMPSIT.
Transfer of Contract.&-Thompson contracted to buy an interest ih
two oil-wells, afterwards an oil company was incorporated to which
Thompson transferred his interest, the vendors in the mean time receir-
ing and selling the oil; by agreement, the vendors made the deed to the
corporation, and dated it back to the date of the contract, agreeing to
deliver Thompson's share.of the oil to the company: Eld, that assunp-
sit in the name of the company for oil received by the vendors between
the contract and the incorporation could be maintained: Snow v. Thomp-
son Oil Co., 59 Pa.
The facts constituted an original contract between the vendors and the
company: Id.
BANKS.
Usage-Special Deposits- Contracts for Payment n Coin.-On the
30th of December, 1861, A. sent to the Chesapeake Bank $3000, in
gold coin of the United States, which in accordance with a previous
agreement, was received as a special deposit, and entered on the bank-
book of A., as follows: "1861, Dec. 30tb, Cash (coin) $3000." At
the date of this deposit, the banks of the state had suspended specie
payments, and gold coin was at a small premium. A. drew two checks
I From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 29 Md. Rep.
2 From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 59 Pa. Rep.
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on the bank for the amount so deposited-one dated the 27th of May,
1864, for $3000, "in gold coin," the other dated 28th May 1864, for
$3000, "in coin." When the first was presented gold was refused, and
notes were offered, which were declined; and the like occurred with the
s6cond check. The bank-book of A. was balanced at different times
between the date of the deposit and the dates of the checks, and the
balance of money in bank to A.'s credit was never under $3000. On
the 28th of May 1864, gold was at eighty-five and eighty-six-and-a-half
premium. On the 2d of July 1864, A. brought his action against the
bank to recover the amount of- the deposit in specie. field:-
That the single entry in the bank-book of the plaintiff of the deposit
made on the 30th of December 1861, apart from the other entries in the
book, was admissible as evidence on his behalf for the purpose of verify-
ing the testimony of the witness, who testified as to the circumstances
of the deposit, and of showing the nature of the entry itself, as indica-
tive of the character of the deposit-the defendant being at liberty to
use the other entries;
That the plaintiff could properly introduce evidence to show, that
according to the general and well-known usage of the banks in the city
of Baltimore, existing before and at the time of the deposit, and ever
since, the entry in his bank-book imported an agreement on the part of
the defendant to return the deposit in kind;
That the subsequent payment of checks, and the striking of balances
in the bank-book of the plaintiff, from time to time, did not necessarily
extinguish the special deposit;
That if the contract between the plaintiff and defendant be established,
as alleged by the former, then he is entitled to recover in specie the
amount of the coin so deposited, with interest thereon payable in like
currency, from the time of the demand;
Whether the Legal Tender Acts of Congress be constitutional or
otherwise, a contract which provides for payment in coin, may be en-
forced in conformity with its stipulations, and judgment may be ren-
dered for the amount in coin, and the same enforced by execution, on
which coin only shall be collected: COiesapeahe Bank v. Swain, 29 Md.
BROKER.
Commssons.-A broker, to be entitled to his commissions for nego-
tiating a sale of property, must find a purchaser in a situation, and
ready and willing to complete the purchase according to the terms agreed
on, and who ultimately becomes the purchaser: Kimberiy v. Henderson,
29 Md.
CONGRESS.
Act of 1864 as to Compensation to JAIembers for Services.-A., a lawyer,
was a candidate for Congress at the election in 1864: neither he nor his
competitor received a certificate of election. On the 20th of April
1865 he procured from the war department the discharge of a drafted
man, under a contract previously made. On the 19th of February
1866, he obtained his seat on his primdfacie case and was ousted July
16. Held, that the contract was not in violation of the Act of Congress
of June 11th 1864, prohibiting members of Congress, &c., from receiv-
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ing compensation for services before a department, &c.: Bowman v.
Coff,'oth, 59 Pa.
A. was not a member of Congress within the meaning of the act: Id.
The contract was against public policy and void, whether compensa-
sation for the services was fixed or contingent: Id.
CONTRACT. See Congress.
Privi ege on Another's Land.-Cowan by writing granted to Johnston
and others 'as partners, the privilege to take clay from his land for
twenty years at 12 cents per ton; to pay $150 at the end of every six
months, although they should not then have taken away so much clay
as would amount to that sum. Held, that the writing was an instrument
for the payment of money within the Affidavit of Defence Law: John-
ston et aI. v. Cowan, 59 Pa.
Tfie plaintiff by a special count set out that the defendants agreed in
writing to pay him "$150 on the 1st of October 1866, $150 on the
1st of April 1867, $150 on the 1st of October 1867, and $150 ,on said
days semi-annually thereafter, a copy of which agreement ,is-hereto
attached," &c. Held, to be sufficiently specific for the court to' order a
liquidation by the prothonotary: Id.
Filing the agreement was of itself a copy of the claim, and no more
could be recovered than'was due on it: Id.
The writing was an agreement to pay for the privilege of taking clay
whther exercised or net: d.
The sums to be paid if the minimur of clay was not taken out were
liquidated damages, being a payment for a privilege and the contract
not being amere license: Id.
The agreement was signed by the grantor, and the firm name was
signed "per J. R.," one of them. Held, that if the grant of an interest
in land, it was a sufficient signing within the Statute of Frauds: the
owner having signed and that bound him: Id.
The owner who conveys must be bound by writing, but the other
party for anything contained in the statute need not so be bound: Id.
CORPORATIONS. See Railroad.
Contracts ultra vires.-The Maryland Hospital agreed with F., in
consideration of $1200, to support his sister, then a lunatic patient in
the institution, for the remainder of her life. The money was paid.
F. also fully paid for the support of his sister to the 1st of July 1863,
and the sum paid in commutation relieved him from that date from any
further charge in the fiture for her support. The lunatic died on the
12th of August 1864. ( Subsequently, F. sued the hospital to recover
back the sum he hadl paid under the contract, less the necessary ex-.
penses incurred in the support of his sister, from the 1st of July 1863
to the 12th of August'1864. Held:-
1st. That the hospital had no power under its charter to make this
contract with F.; it was tdtra vires not binding on the corporation, and
could not have been enforced in favor of F.;
2d. That the contract was neither malum in se nor malumn prohibi-
tumn, and the parties to it were not in pari delicto, and F. was entitled
to recover back the sum paid by him, less the amount properly charge-
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able as a fair and reasonable allowance for the care and keeping of his
sister during the period which intervened between the 30th of June
1863 and the 12th of August 1864, the date of her death: Mary/land
Hospital v. Foreman, 29 Md.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Disturbance of a Meeting.-Maliciously disturbing a meeting of school
directors is indictable at common law: Campbell v. Commonwealth, 59
Pa.
It is too late to make objections to the form of an indictment in the
Supreme.Court: Id.
ESTOPPEL.
Silence when there is Duty/ to speak.-Positive acts tending to mislead
one ignorant of the truth, which do mislead him to his injury, are good
ground of estoppel, and ignorance of title on the part of him who is
estopped will not excuse him: Chapman v. Chapman and Gansamer,
59 Pa.
Silence will postpone a title when one knowing his own right should
speak out: Id.
One led by such silence ignorantly and innocently to rest on his title,
believing it secure, and to expend money and make improvements,
without timely warning, will be protected by estoppel: Id.
Sale of Public Property/.-A., an officer of the United States army,
took a horse belonging to the government, and having had the brand
removed used him as his individual property for some time, and then
sold him to B., who for nearly a year hired him out as a public livery-
horse to parties, both civil and military, in the city of Baltimore. No
steps were taken during this time by iny agent of the United States
Government to recover the horse. B; finally sold the horse to 0., and
shortly thereafter he was taken out of his possession under an order of
the assistant provost-marshal, as the property of the United States
Government. In an action against B., by the last purchaser, to recover
what he had paid for the horse, it was held:-
1. That the government was not estopped from reclaiming the horse
as its property;
2. That persons dealing with agents or officers in regard to public
property, are bound to know the extent of their authority;
3. That the bare possession of the horse by A., with the consent of
the officers of the government, and the sale by him to B., were not suffi-
cient to pass title to the purchaser;
4. That although A. may have obtained possession of the horse from
the quartermaster, and B. may have been a bond fide purchaser, a sale
thus made, without the authority or assent of the government, could not
operate as a transfer of title against the latter: Johnson v. Frisbie, 29
Md.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Contract.
INSURANCE.
Partnership Property.-Goods were owned by two jointly; in effect-
ing an insurance the agent told one that to insure the interest of both,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
it made no difference whether or not both names were in the policy; he
received a premium proportionate to the whole, and a policy was issued
in the name of one. Beld, that these facts showed a mistake in the
agent and were admissible in evidence, and that upon a total loss the
whole interest might be recovered in a suit in the name of the one to
whom the policy had been issued: Manhtattan Ins. Co. v. Webster,
59 Pa.
Each partner being liable in solido for the firm engagements, has a
right to have the firm assets applied in the first instance to the payment
of the firm debts: Id.
The interest of A partner is only his proportion of the capital or pro-
fits after all the debts are paid: Id.
A partner has an insurable interest in the entire stock, and on the
receipt for a loss of insurance he must account to the firm: Id.
MASTIER AND SERVANT. See Nelience.
NEGLIGENCE.
Lyjury by Act of Fdlow-servant.-When several persons are employed
as workmen in the same general service, though in different parts of it,
and one of them is injured through the carelessness of another, the
employer is not responsible unless he had employed unfit persons for the
service: O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R. R. Co., 59 Pa.
Ryan v. Th6 .P nsylvania 2airoad Co., 11 Harris 384, remarked
on: Id.
A carpenter working as such for a'raiIroad company, was carried on
the company's cars to and from his work as part of his contract of hiring.
He was not to be esteemed as employed in the same general service with
the hands running the train or repairing the track of the road, so as to
relieve the company from responsibility for injury to him from their
negligence: Id.
The master is bound to use ordinary care in providing suitable struc-
ture, machinery, tools, &c,, and in selecting proper servants, and is
liable to other servants in the same employment, if they are injured by
his own neglect of duty: Id.
A railroad company is bound to furnish a safe and sufficient roadway
to its servants, as well as others travelling over it. The remote negli-
gence of servants as to the roadway will not excuse the non-performance
of such duty: Id.
If the substructure of a road be suffered to lie until it has become
rotten and unsafe, it is the negligence of the company: Id.
Casualty from such cause is not an ordinary peril which one taking
service in the company is presumed to incur: Id. .t
In a suit by an employee. of a railroad company who held the relation
.of a passenger, the court charged, that the baggage-car is an improper
place for a passenger to ride; whether the rule against it was communi-
cated to him or not, if he left his seat in the passenger-car and went
into the baggage-car it was negligence, which nothing less than a direc-
tion or invitation from the conductor would excuse; such invitation
should not be inferred from his having ridden there frequently with the
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knowledge of the conductor, and without objection. Reld, to be error:
Id.
The conductor is the person to administer the rules of the company,
,and apply them according to the circumstances. The passenger-travel
is under his directions and should conform to them. From the nature
of his position he must exercise some discretion: Id.
Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff.-In an action whose gravamen
is negligence, it is the duty of the plaintiff to show a case clear of
contributory negligence. There must be shown a prima facie case
resulting exclusively from the wrong of the defendant, before he can
be called to answer: Waters v. Wing, 59 Pa.
The plaintiff's horse was killed by the shaft of the defendant's car-
riage running into him, both being on a public highway. The defend-
ant asked the court to charge: "That the defendant had a right to be
on the public highway, and if the jury believe that at the time of the
alleged accident he was travelling in an ordinary manner, he is not liable
for an injury resulting from such use of the public thoroughfare." .eld,
that the point should have been affirmed: Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Insurance.
RAILROAD. See Negligence.
Negligence.-It is the duty of a railroad coinpany as of a Batural
person to exercise its rights with a considerate and prudent regard for
the rights and safety of others: Pennslvauia R. R. Co. v. Barnet,
59 Pa.
It is not a justification that the act producing the injury was lawful
or done in exercising a lawful right, if the injury arose from doing it
negligently: Id.
The engine of the defendants having given no notice of its approach
whistled under a bridge whilst a traveller was passing over it: his horses
took fright, ran off, and injured the traveller. Reld, that if danger
might be reasonably apprehended, it was the duty of the company to
give some warning: Id.
If it would have been negligence in the traveller to drive upon the
bridge just as the train was about to pass under it, had he been aware
of its approach, he was entitled to notice, and it was the duty of the
company to give it: Id.
Negligence is always a question for the jury, when there is any doubt
as to the facts or the inference to be drawn from them; Id.
If danger to the person or property of others at any point may be
reasonably apprehended, or is likely to result from the running of trains
without notice, it is the duty of the company to give notice : Id.
. Sounding the whistle under a bridge as a traveller was passing over,
which causes the horses to run away through fright and injure the tra-
veller, was a sufficiently proximate cause of injury to create a liability
on the company: Id.
